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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of goods market frictions in accounting for the large
and volatile deviations from the Law of One Price in a framework of exible prices.
We draw a distinction between goods market frictions that are required to consume
tradable goods (e.g., distribution costs) and those that are necessary for international
transactions (e.g., trade costs). We nd that trade costs generate LOP deviations by
introducing a no-arbitrage band, while distribution costs cause the price to deviate
from the LOP by a¤ecting the probability that trade will occur, given the band. We
then conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to show that real exchange rate volatility is
positively associated with trade costs, but negatively related to distribution costs. This
e¤ect depends on the interplay of trade costs and distribution costs, as they work in
opposite directions when creating arbitrage opportunities.
Keywords: Distribution costs, trade costs, law of one price, real exchange rate volatility
JEL classication: F31; F37
Department of International Trade, Soongsil University, 369 Sangdo-Ro, Dongjak-gu, Seoul, 156-743,
Korea. Email: iklee1120@ssu.ac.kr
yDepartment of Economics, Korea University, 145 Anam-Ro, Seongbuk-Gu, Seoul, 136-701, Korea. Email:
starpac@korea.ac.kr
1 Introduction
One of the most enduring puzzles in international macroeconomics, observed since the begin-
ning of the post-Bretton Woods era, is that deviations from the Law of One Price (LOP) and
its generalization, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), are not only large but also highly volatile
and persistent. Rogo¤ (1996) refers to the juxtaposition of these observations and the pre-
dictions of structural models as the PPP puzzle. Traditionally, the attempts to address this
puzzle have been based on the distinction between tradable and non-tradable goods. How-
ever, since the inuential work by Engel (1999), most studies have shed light on the LOP
deviations of tradable goods as the empirically relevant foundation of the current theoretical
approaches.1 Two main branches of the literature explore the LOP deviations of tradable
goods. The rst branch introduces nominal rigidities into dynamic equilibrium models (see,
for example, Betts and Devereux (2000), Bergin and Feenstra (2001), Chari et al. (2002),
Kehoe and Midrigan (2007), and Carvalho and Nechio (2011)). While useful in addressing
monetary policy, such models lack the ability to provide a plausible mechanism for sustain-
ing deviations from the LOP of the magnitude observed in the data. A second strand of the
literature emphasizes the importance of transaction costs. These models predict that real
exchange rates are bounded by the xed limits of arbitrage costs, which are treated broadly
to include transportation and other costs of bringing goods to nal consumption markets
(see, for example, Sercu et al. (1995), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), Burstein et al. (2003),
Sercu and Uppal (2003), Crucini et al. (2005), and Corsetti et al. (2007)). This paper ts
into the second strand of the literature.
Although the importance of international transaction costs in generating LOP deviations
has been well documented, only a few papers have studied the role played by domestic
transaction costs and their interplay with international costs in shaping the behavior of the
real exchange rate. In this paper, we o¤er a new approach to explain the PPP puzzle in a
framework of exible prices. We specify a two-country world economy, allowing for two types
of goods market frictions, namely, international trade costs and domestic distribution services.
The inclusion of these frictions allows us to endogenously drive a natural wedge between the
1Engel (1999) shows that almost all the real exchange rate uctuations are attributable to uctuations in
the relative prices of tradable goods between the U.S. and other industrialzed countries.
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prices in di¤erent locations and thus account for the deviations from the LOP, even though all
goods are tradable. Further, the distinction between domestic and international costs guides
us to highlight two di¤erent channels through which these costs a¤ect LOP deviations.
Our model thus encompasses the main elements of the standard models that study the
role of transaction costs in explaining real exchange rate dynamics. However, our approach
has three notable distinctions. First, we distinguish between domestic and international
goods market frictions. Specically, in addition to iceberg-type international trade costs, we
incorporate domestic distribution costs by assuming that consuming a tradable good requires
certain units of distribution services. Second, we elaborate on channels through which these
costs and their interactions can a¤ect the magnitude and volatility of LOP deviations. Third,
we do not model nominal rigidities and deliberately focus on the role of goods market frictions.
Our approach is meant to o¤er a framework to help understand the long-run real exchange
rate by placing an emphasis on real frictions that drive large and volatile deviations from the
LOP.
Our main ndings are as follows. As widely known, trade costs appear to introduce
the no-arbitrage band in which trade does not occur and hence directly generate the LOP
deviations. We nd that distribution costs also contribute to these deviations by a¤ecting
the direction of trade and the probability that trade will occur given the no-arbitrage band.
By doing so, an increase in trade costs enlarges the deviations from the LOP by widening the
no-arbitrage band, whereas a unilateral rise in distribution costs makes the real exchange rate
more likely to move toward the boundary of the band generating the LOP deviations. The
Monte Carlo Simulation shows that the volatility of LOP deviations is positively associated
with trade costs, but negatively related to distribution costs. This e¤ect depends on the
interplay of trade costs and distribution costs, as they work in opposite directions when
creating arbitrage opportunities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section 3 solves for
the equilibrium real exchange rate and discusses how distribution costs and trade costs a¤ect
the deviations from the LOP. Section 4 carries out a Monte Carlo simulation to examine the
e¤ects of goods market frictions on the real exchange rate volatility. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
Our framework builds on the model proposed by Sercu and Uppals (2003) model, which we
generalize in two respects.2 First, we introduce non-tradable goods. Second, we incorporate
distribution services that are made up of non-tradable goods. The main di¤erences arising
from the existence of non-tradable goods and distribution services appear in the preference
and resource constraints. The world economy consists of two countries of identical size, a
home (HC) and a foreign country (FC). We use an asterisk (*) to denote variables associated
with the foreign country. Each country is populated by a large number of innitely-lived
consumers who have utility dened over sequences of consumption of tradable (CTt ) and
non-tradable goods (CNTt ),
U =
1X
t=0
t
h 
CTt
  
CNTt
1 i1 
1   (1)
in the home country, and
U =
1X
t=0
t
h 
CTt
  
CNTt
1 i1 
1   (2)
in the foreign country, where 0<<1 is the expenditure share of tradable goods, 0<<1 is
the discount factor, and >1 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In every period, each economy is exogenously endowed with tradable (Y Tt ) and non-tradable
(Y NTt ) goods that are non-storable. We assume that nancial markets are perfectly integrated
and complete such that nancial claims are traded freely. Following Burstein et al. (2003),
we introduce a distribution sector by assuming that consuming a tradable good requires
 units of distribution services, which consist of non-tradable goods.3 Distribution sectors
are assumed to be heterogeneous across countries because wholesaling, retailing, and local
transportation tend to be isolated from other countries and hence exhibit a wide range of
2Sercu and Uppal (2003) analyze the relationship between exchange rate volatility and volume of trade,
pointing out that a drop in the shipment costs implies a decrease in exchange rate volatility.
3Noting that wholesaling, retailing and transportation do not play a signicant role in the most important
non-tradable sectors (i.e., housing, health, and education expenditures), we assume that consumptions of
non-tradables do not require distribution services, as suggested by Burstein et al. (2003).
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distribution costs across countries. Since the endowment of non-tradable goods can be either
consumed or used for distribution services in each country, we have the following:
Y NTt = C
NT
t + C
T
t (3)
Y NTt = C
NT
t + 
CTt (4)
We next introduce international trade costs of the iceberg type by assuming that a pro-
portion of the physical shipment of the tradable good is lost in transit. We use  to denote
the trade costs faced by home and foreign individuals, which are symmetric across countries.
In this setting, when one unit is shipped, only 1
1+
units actually arrive. Given the presence
of trade costs, the resource constraints for the home and foreign country are given by
CTt = Y
T
t  Xt +
Xt
1 + 
(5)
CTt = Y
T
t  Xt +
Xt
1 + 
(6)
0  Xt  Y Tt (7)
0  Xt  Y Tt (8)
where Xt is the amount of exports from the home country (measured before trade costs) and
Xt
1+
is the amount of imports from the foreign country (measured after trade costs).
Given our assumption of complete nancial markets, the model is solved as a central
planner problem whose objective is to maximize the aggregate utility by choosing the amount
of trade:
Max
fXt;Xt g
U
 
CTt ; C
NT
t

+ U
 
CTt ; C
NT
t

(9)
subject to constraints (3)-(8)
Because this problem is essentially static, we drop the time subscript t henceforth to
simplify the notations.
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3 LOP deviations
When nancial markets are complete, the ratio of home to foreign marginal utility of con-
sumption is linked to real exchange rates. From the optimality condition of consumption,
it follows that the relative price of any pair of goods can be seen as a marginal rate of
substitution in the optimum,
Q =
@U
 
CT; CNT

@CT
@U (CT ; CNT )@CT
(10)
where Q denotes the real exchange rate of tradable goods between the home and foreign
countries. From a standard Lagrangian problem of a central planner, the real exchange rate
of tradable goods is then given as follows:4
Q =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 +  if K > 1 +  : HC exports
K =

Y T
Y T

Y NT
Y T  

!
Y
NT
Y T  



Y NT
Y T
 
!
Y
NT
Y T
 
 if 1
1+
 K  1 +  : No-trade
1
1+
if K < 1
1+
: FC exports
(11)
where ! =  +    .5
Equation (11) shows that the behavior of the real exchange rate is determined by three
key elements: rst, the output ratios of tradable and non-tradable goods between countries;
second, the trade costs; and third, the distribution services. In the absence of non-tradable
goods and trade costs, the central planner always equalizes the marginal utilities of con-
sumption of tradable goods across countries, leading the real exchange rate equal to unity.
However, in an economy with goods market frictions, the tradable goods will be moved across
countries only if the gains from trade are su¢ ciently large to cover these frictions. To see
how our model bears this out, consider three possible trade and price pairings, as shown in
Equation (11). First, if the home output of tradable goods is su¢ ciently large relative to the
foreign output that the gains from trade are large enough to cover the trade costs, the goods
ow from the home country to the foreign country, and the price in the foreign country is 
4The derivation of equation (11) is available upon request
5Following Burstein et al. (2003), we assume Y
NT
Y T
>  and
Y NT
Y T >

 throughout our theoretical and
simulation studies
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greater than the home price. Second, if the foreign output is su¢ ciently large relative to the
home output, goods ow from the foreign country to the home country and the price in the
home country is  greater than the foreign price. Third, when the output ratio of tradable
goods is su¢ ciently close across countries, a non-trade equilibrium exists. In this case, the
implied price di¤erential is not su¢ cient at these endowment levels to justify paying the
trade costs. Therefore, the implicit relative price is a matter of reading o¤ the appropriate
marginal valuations, expressed as the ratio of home and foreign marginal utility evaluated at
autarkic output points.
It is worthwhile to note that, because of distribution costs, the real exchange rate (Q)
does not move in tandem with the output ratios within the no-arbitrage band, driving a
natural wedge between relative prices in di¤erent locations. To see why distribution costs
generate the deviations from the LOP, note that Equation ((11) implies that the response of
K to a change in Y T is
dK
dY T
= K
 +  + 1
Y T
+

Y NT   Y T

> 0 (12)
The change in K is increasing in Y T and, more importantly, this e¤ect is magnied by
the home distribution cost (). This is intuitive, since increasing the distribution cost has
similar e¤ects to decreasing home consumptions of the tradable good. The combination
of the rst condition of Equation (11) and Equation (12) implies that a given increase in
Y T produces a larger probability that the home country can export the larger is the home
domestic distribution cost. As such, an increase in home distribution costs makes the price in
the foreign country more likely to be  greater than the home price, thus causing deviations
from the LOP. Therefore, trade costs generate the LOP deviations by introducing the no-
arbitrage band, while distribution costs cause the price to deviate from the LOP by a¤ecting
the probability that trade occurs given the no-arbitrage band.
Lastly, from Equation (11), one can easily see how the LOP deviations of tradable goods
decay as we move from an economy with goods market frictions to an economy without these
frictions. When distribution services do not exist (i.e.,  =  = 0), trade costs still drive
a natural wedge between relative prices in di¤erent locations, however the real exchange
rates now move in tandem with output ratios within the threshold. When both distribution
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services and non-tradable goods are absent (i.e.,  =  = 0,  = 1), the real exchange
rate within the threshold does not depend on the output ratio of non-tradable goods. In an
extreme case where all goods market frictions are eliminated ( =  =  = 0,  = 1), the
central planner sets the optimal relative consumption of the tradable good equal to unity
and corrects any deviations from unity by re-allocating goods. As a result, the LOP will
unambiguously hold for tradable goods such that the real exchange rate equals to unity.
4 Volatility of LOP deviations
Our results discussed in Section 3 support the argument that unless price di¤erentials exceed
the no-arbitrage band, trade does not take place and price deviates freely; however, when the
price di¤erentials are large enough to o¤set international trade costs, trade occurs and price
di¤erentials in excess of the band are eventually arbitraged away. Therefore, the no-arbitrage
band generated by goods market frictions is equivalent to a band of inaction, such that
LOP deviations decay slowly within the no-arbitrage band but rapidly outside the band.
Motivated by the fact that the arbitrage limits depend on the goods market frictions, in the
following discussion we explore the e¤ect of these frictions on the real exchange rate volatility
by simulating our model. Since the volatility of LOP deviations, measured as the time series
variance of lnQ in Equation (11), does not have closed form analytical solutions, we resort
to a numerical experiment by conducting a Monte Carlo simulation. To gain insights into
how changes in trade costs and distribution costs can a¤ect the volatility of LOP deviations,
we rst analyze the approximation of the volatility by focusing on the probability that trade
does not occur. Then we conduct numerical experiments to quantify the importance of these
costs.6
6We aim to provide meaningful insights into how goods market frictions can a¤ect real exchange rate
volatility rather than evaluate the performance of the model in matching the time series properties observed
in the data. We leave the latter work for our future study.
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4.1 Simulating the model
Since the two economies considered in this model are symmetric in their preferences, all of
the parameters governing the curvature properties of the utility function have the same value
in both economies. We set  to 2; as suggested by Backus et al. (1994), and  to 0.3 which
is obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.7 Following Burstein et al. (2003), we
set  =  = 1:0 as a baseline value and vary  from 1:0 to 2:0 to see the responses of the real
exchange rate volatility to an increase in home distribution costs.8 As is widely known, it is
di¢ cult to compute the trade costs due to the inconsistency across countries in the bilateral
value and quantity data for trade, the cross-hauling of goods, and aggregation bias. For this
reason, we choose a reasonable value for  (= 0:1) and then evaluate the behavior of the real
exchange rate for di¤erent values of  (0:1 s 1:0).9
The Monte Carlo simulation is based on a data generation process of which algorithms
depend on the distributional assumptions of output ratios. Our distributional assumptions
are as follows. First, ln Y
T
Y T
iids N

0;
 
T
2
.10 A set of su¢ cient conditions for this assump-
tion is Y T s N

T ; 1
2
 
T
2
; Y T s N

T ; 1
2
 
T
2
for Y T ? Y T. Second, ln Y NT
Y T
and
ln Y
NT
Y T are identically distributed. Third, from the recognition that
Y NT
Y T
> 

; Y
NT
Y T >


;
7The expenditure share of the non-tradable sector in the U.S. ranges between 69.0% and 72.1% for the
period 1990-2010.
8Setting  = 1 implies that the distribution margin is 50%, which is dened as the excess of retail price
over producer price and measured as a percentage of the retail price. Burstein et al. (2003) report that
distribution margins of consumption goods for six OECD countries (Canada, France, Germany Italy, Japan,
the UK, and the U.S.) range between 35% and 50%.
9Hummels (2001) estimates trade costs based on the direct measurement of the freight rate, which is
dened as the ratio of transportation expenditure to the value of imports exclusive of freight and insurance
charges. The all-commodities trade-weighted average freight rate ranges from 3.8% for the U.S. to 13.3% for
Paraguay. Across commodities in the U.S., the freight rate ranges from a low of 0.9% for transport equipment
to a high of 27% for crude fertilizer. In their extensive survey of the measurement of trade costs, Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004) show that 170% of representative trade costs in industrialized countries breaks
down into 21% of transportation costs, 44% of border-related trade barriers, and 55% of retail and wholesale
distribution costs.
10One might also assume that the di¤erence of the log of the output ratio is normally distributed, considering
the fact that the real exchange rate tends to exhibit random walk behavior within the band.
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we assume that ln Y
NT
Y T
 TruncN (; 2; lnRmin;1) ; ln Y NTY T  TruncN (; 2; lnRmin;1)
where TruncN (; 2; lnRmin;1) is a normal distribution with mean  and variance 2 trun-
cated from below lnRmin. Lastly, we assume Y
T
Y T ,
Y NT
Y T
, and Y
NT
Y T are mutually independent
of each other.
The basic idea of the Monte Carlo simulation is simple. Given the parameters ; ; T ;
and Rmin as well as  , , , 
, and , we can generate a multiple of triples

Y T
Y T ;
Y NT
Y T
; Y
NT
Y T

from the assumed distributions, and then from each of which we can compute lnK and lnQ.
Suppose we generate n of the triples, namely
n
Y T
Y T

i
;

Y NT
Y T

i
;

Y NT
Y T

i

; i = 1; :::; n
o
.
Then we can compute f(lnK)i ; i = 1; :::; ng and f(lnQ)i ; i = 1; :::; ng using Equation (11).
The 1
n
Pn
i=1
 
(lnQ)i   lnQ
2
converges to V [lnQ] in probability as n!1 due to the law of
large numbers for iid observations, where lnQ = 1
n
Pn
i=1 (lnQ)i and V [lnQ] is the volatility
of LOP deviations measured by the time-series variance of lnQ. The e¤ect of changes in 
and  can be visualized by showing V [lnQ] for di¤erent  and .
Let us explain how we set the parameters ; ; T ; and Rmin for our simulations. While
we vary  from 0.1 to 1 to see the e¤ects of  on V [lnQ], the choice of  does not a¤ect
the generation of
n
Y T
Y T

i
;

Y NT
Y T

i
;

Y NT
Y T

i

; i = 1; :::; n
o
. Rmin needs to be greater than
maxf;g

for the values of (; ). Since we vary  from 1.0 to 2.0 while holding the  at
1.0 in order to see the e¤ect of changes in , Rmin must be greater than 2:0 =
2:0
0:3
. We
choose Rmin = 2:010:3 = 6:7. As far as we know, there is no consensus on the values for ; ;
and T . We choose   0:138 and 2 =  T 2  0:078 so that, along with Rmin = 6:7,
E
h
Y NT
Y T
i
= E
h
Y NT
Y T
i
 7:5 which we believe is a reasonable value. Lastly, we choose
n = 500; 000.
Before proceeding to simulations, it is useful to note that, from Equation (11), the volatil-
ity of the LOP deviations is given by
V [lnQ] = E

lnQ2
  (E [lnQ])2
= (Pl + Pu) (ln (1 + ))
2 + (1  Pl   Pu)E

(lnK)2

  ((Pu   Pl) ln (1 + ) + (1  Pl   Pu)E [lnK])2
= (Pl (E [lnK] + 2 ln (1 + )) + Pu (E [lnK]  2 ln (1 + ))) (1  Pl   Pu)E [lnK]
+
 
(Pl + Pu)  (Pu   Pl)2

(ln (1 + ))2 + (1  Pl   Pu)V [lnK] (13)
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where Pl  Pr [lnK    ln (1 + )] and Pu  Pr [lnK  ln (1 + )] : Although this expression
can be hardly approximated, it provides meaningful insights into how goods market frictions
can a¤ect the volatility of LOP deviations. Consider a rise in trade costs between countries,
i.e., an increase in  for unchanged levels of  and . From Equation (11), we know that
a higher  unambiguously widens the no-arbitrage band within which price di¤erentials can
uctuate before arbitrage begins, while K remains una¤ected. Thus, an increase in  is
expected to produce a larger V [lnQ] by raising (1  Pl   Pu). A rise in home distribution cost
() has two e¤ects: a direct e¤ect on (1  Pl   Pu) and an indirect e¤ect via the probability
mass of K being on the boundary point of the no-arbitrage band. These e¤ects are captured
by looking at the impact of  on E [lnK] which is approximated as follows:
E [lnK]  (   ) e
 + 1
2
2( )


2 + (
 + ) 3e +
3
2
2( 2)
( )

(14)
where 2 = (1  )
 
   1  1


, 3 = 12 (1  )
 
   1    1
2

,  =   lnRmin 

, s =R s
 1  (t) dt and s =
1p
2
e 
1
2
s2 . Given our parameter values, we have 2   1:63; 3   3:64
and hence Equation(14) implies
@
@
E [lnK]   2 e
 + 1
2
2

( )   23 e
 2+22

( 2) > 0 (15)
Although not provided here, our simulation results show that V [lnK] is a positive func-
tion of ; indicating @
@
V [lnK] > 0:11
Equation(15) and @
@
V [lnK] > 0 imply that an increase in  drives up the mean and the
variance of lnK and hence increases the probability that the home country will export to
the foreign country (i.e., a rise in Pu and a fall in (1  Pl   Pu)), which is consistent with
the discussion in the previous section. As the chance that lnK falls outside the no-arbitrage
band rises, there will be more probability mass of lnK at the boundary point ln(1+), which
will then reduce the real exchange rate volatility. Therefore, we can infer from Equation (13)
that a rise in  increases V [lnQ] by broadening the extent to which real exchange rates
uctuate freely, while a larger value of  will decrease V [lnQ] by placing more probability
mass of lnK on the upper boundary of the no-arbitrage band.
11The derivation of E [lnKt] and V [lnKt] and the simulation result of @@V [lnKt] are o¤ered in Appendix
A and Appendix B, respectively.
11
4.2 Simulation results
We provide simulation results for the volatility of LOP deviations in which initially  = 0:1;
 =  = 1. Figure 1 illustrates the responses of arbitrage opportunities to changes in
trade costs and home distribution costs. As expected, one can see that the probability that
trade does not occur increases with trade costs and decreases with distribution costs. More
specically, a rise in  monotonically increases Pr [  ln (1 + )  lnK  ln (1 + )] ; and this
e¤ect is magnied as  falls. In contrast, Pr [  ln (1 + )  lnKt  ln (1 + )] decreases in
, with the e¤ect being magnied as  rises. This result suggests that the extent to which
goods market frictions a¤ect arbitrage opportunity depends on the interplay of trade costs
and distribution costs. As a higher  is associated with higher Pr [lnKt  ln (1 + )], a given
increase in  produces a lower Pr [  ln (1 + )  lnK  ln (1 + )] the larger is . Similarly,
a given increase in  produces a lower Pr [lnK  ln (1 + )] the larger is  :
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Figure 1. Responses of arbitrage opportunities to  and 
Figure 2 plots the variance of LOP deviations against trade costs and distribution costs
where  and  range from 0.1 to 1 and 1 to 2, respectively. Apparently, the volatility of LOP
deviations is positively associated with the size of trade costs, while it is negatively related
to distribution costs. The economic mechanisms at work can be summarized as follows.
There are two e¤ects at work. The rst e¤ect stems from the expansion of the no-arbitrage
band caused by the increase in trade costs. The second is the boundary e¤ect caused by the
increase in distribution costs. Higher trade costs make goods less likely to be traded, and
hence widens the no-arbitrage band within which LOP deviations uctuate, leading to an
increase in the real exchange rate volatility. Because trade costs and distribution costs work in
opposite directions when creating arbitrage opportunities, the positive relationship between
trade costs and real exchange rate volatility becomes more evident when home distribution
costs decline.
On the other hand, higher home distribution costs make goods more likely to ow from
the home country to the foreign country, causing the real exchange rate to lie on the upper
boundary of the band. This means that an increase in home distribution costs reduces real
exchange rate volatility by placing more probability mass of lnK on the upper boundary of
the no-arbitrage band. Note that, when trade costs are high, an increase in  in an early
stage (say, from  = 1 to  = 1:5) may not be enough to lead LOP deviations to lie on
the boundary of the band, making little changes in real exchange rate volatility. However,
the negative relationship between home distribution costs and real exchange rate volatility
becomes stronger as  increases further (say, from  = 1:5 to  = 2:0), which induces LOP
deviations to be more likely to lie on the boundary.
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Figure 2. Responses of real exchange rate volatility to  and 
We next vary the value of the intertemporal substitution parameter as a sensitivity check
of the benchmark model. In Panel B of Table 1, we provide the volatility of LOP deviations for
 = 5. The main ndings in the benchmark case still hold when  gets large: real exchange
rate volatility responds positively to trade costs, but negatively to distribution costs. A
notable di¤erence arises with respect to the magnitude of the volatility itself. Compared to
the benchmark case, the LOP deviations are evidently more volatile at every level of goods
market frictions. For example, the variance rises from 0.2049 to 0.3051 for the case where
 = 1:0 and  = 1:0. The parameter  measures the extent to which individuals are willing
to substitute consumptions over time. Therefore, as  gets large, it takes larger changes in
relative prices to get individuals to alter their consumption plans over time, leading LOP
deviations to become more volatile.
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Table 1. Summary of simulation results: V [lnQt]
Panel A:  = 2  = 0:1  = 0:5  = 1:0
 = 1:0 .0083 .1031 .2049
 = 1:5 .0060 .0772 .1655
 = 2:0 .0007 .0100 .0295
Panel B:  = 5  = 0:1  = 0:5  = 1:0
 = 1:0 .0086 .1266 .3051
 = 1:5 .0083 .1217 .2931
 = 2:0 .0032 .0482 .1244
5 Conclusions
Understanding the determinants of LOP deviations and their links to real exchange rate
volatility is a key challenge in international macroeconomics. Although a substantial body of
empirical and theoretical work has documented this question, the channel through which real
and nominal frictions a¤ect the puzzling behavior of real exchange rates remains unclear. In
this paper, we o¤er an alternative approach to address the issue. By modeling the distribution
costs and trade costs in a framework of exible prices, we explicitly analyze the role of goods
market frictions in driving large and volatile deviations from the LOP. We rst show that
trade costs in conjunction with output ratios generate the no-arbitrage band in which trade
does not occur, while distribution costs cause the price to deviate from the LOP by a¤ecting
the probability that trade will occur, given the band. Therefore, arbitrage opportunities and
LOP deviations are directly a¤ected by trade costs through the introduction of the band
of inaction, whereas distribution costs inuence them through a direction of trade and the
resulting movements of LOP deviations toward the boundary of the band.
We next show that the real exchange rate volatility is positively associated with trade
costs, but negatively related to distribution costs. Because these costs work in opposite
directions when creating arbitrage opportunities, the extent to which a cost a¤ects the real
exchange rate volatility hinges on its interaction with the other cost. Our work contributes
to the literature by providing a tractable theoretical framework that can be used to carry out
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explicit analyses of the long-run real exchange rate through the lens of two types of goods
market frictions: domestic transaction costs and international transaction costs. We view
our framework as complementary to those that emphasize the role of sticky prices.
Our nding implies that goods market frictions generate a rigid threshold around which
real exchange rates behave in a non-linear manner. A promising avenue for future work
involves the development of the tractable framework considered here to explicitly examine
the role of distribution services and trade costs in the non-linear mean reversion of the real
exchange rate.
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Appendix A. Approximation of E [lnKt] and V [lnKt]
Let Y
T
Y T  RTt , Y
NT
Y T
 RDt , Y
NT
Y T  RFt . Then lnK can be rewritten as
lnKt =  lnR
T
t + ln

RFt  



  (+ (1  ) ) ln  RFt   
+(+ (1  ) 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
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and RDt > ;it follows that
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Similarly, assuming RFt >


and RFt > 
; we have
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 
RFt   
  lnRFt    1RFt   (
)2
2
1
(RFt )
2
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
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


 lnRFt  


1
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  (
)2
22
1
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2
Therefore, lnKt is approximately given by
lnKt   lnRTt   1 lnRFt + 2
1
RFt
+ ()2 3
1
(RFt )
2
+1 lnR
D
t   2
1
RDt
  23 1
(RDt )
2
where 1  (1  ) (   1), 2  (1  )
 
   1  1


; and 3  12 (1  )
 
   1    1
2

:
It then follows that
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lnRTt
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1
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2
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#
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and, with a further assumption that lnRTt ? lnRDt ? lnRFt ,
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:
With the assumptions of lnRTt  N (0; 2T ) ; lnRDt  TruncN (; 2; lnRmin;1) ;and
lnRFt  TruncN (; 2; lnRmin;1) ;we have
E [lnKt]  E
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lnRTt

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Under the distributional assumptions, it can be shown that, for     lnRmin 

, s =
18
1p
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Therefore under the log-normality and truncated log-normality assumptions, we have
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Appendix B. Simulation result for @
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V [lnKt]
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